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COLLEAGUES:
What you have before you is the skeleton of a research agenda directed at what I
hope are common concerns. It is in the form of an introduction to a paper, because
we are at a conference, and papers are the conventional form of communication at
conferences. I hope the form and the incompleteness of the paper will not distract
you from the substance of the research agenda. To reduce the chances of misunder-
standing, let me just state the core propositions at the outset:
Faced with a set of new challenges, the administrative state in the US, the EU
and Latin America is evolving away from hierarchical and towards what we can
loosely call decentralized, network forms of organization 
If these new types of administration are to be democratically accountable, they
will have to respond to a new kind of public sphere that differs in two ways from
the traditional, Habermasian public sphere that emerged in association with the
nation state.
Where the Habermasian public sphere aims to influence legislative decision-
making, a public sphere that holds network administration accountable will have to
be capable of monitoring and participating in decision-making, as much as influenc-
ing the general legislative frame within which that decision making occurs.
And where the Habermasian public sphere is directed to national issues and
decisions, the new public sphere will have to link local monitoring and participation
with higher, or more encompassing engagements, including the ability to revise
decision-making frameworks.
Charles Sabel
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There are fragmentary and fugitive signs of the emergence of such a new public
sphere in the US and the EU.
But it is in Latin America that the new type of democratic public seems most
likely to develop, because of the current co-evolution there of the public sphere and
of public administration.
Thus countries such as Brazil are developing a potentially distinctive public
sphere in response to the democratization of the oligarchic state, not the formation
of the nation, even while state administration is increasingly “networked” as nation-
al economies, and the communities they shape, integrate into world markets.
But whether the post-oligarchic state will indeed be capable of effective, net-
worked problem solving, and whether the emergent public sphere can indeed hold
that state democratically accountable by monitoring and participating in decision
making across a sufficiently broad range of policy arenas, while linking the relevant
scales of action in each, are two very open questions.
So let’s get to work, taking a close look at developments in Brazil from this per-
spective and using what we learn from this investigation to prod discussion of these
themes in the US and the EU. One place to start might be the role, if any, of neigh-
borhood educational association in school, reform, or of locally based watershed
monitors in pollution control.
But these suggestions are meant only as illustrations of research projects that
would test the general claim that new accountability mechanisms and new prob-
lem-solving institutions are co-evolving.The real questions, of course, are whether
networked administration has the problem solving capacities many, myself includ-
ed, attribute to it; whether the post-nation public sphere can indeed democratical-
ly domesticate the administrative networks, and whether that possibility, if more
than a pipe dream, is being, or could plausibly be realized in Latin America or any-
where else at present.
The Introduction to the following “paper” note presents a fuller version of the
same argument as it emerges from a comparison of current discussion in the US, the
EU, and Latin America. It also contains pointers to recent work of my own that
develops some of the key assertions. The next, and for now last, section of the
“paper” presents a compressed overview of the operating mechanisms and founda-
tional principles of the network or pragmatist organization as it is currently diffus-
ing in both the private and public sectors. In include this because I think that “net-
work administration,” though loosely used, does in fact name a general and funda-
mental organizational innovation that can be precisely characterized. This charac-
terization suggests, I argue, a reorientation in our understanding of governance,
which may in turn direct where we look, and what we look for in a “new” public
sphere. Although the material included raises the governance question and goes
some way towards characterizing pragmatist or network governance, it breaks off
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inconclusively, without raising, much less answering these final, crucial questions
regarding the character of the new public sphere. Even if I could presently do more
than wave my hands at these questions—which it far from certain—any serious
attempt to answer them would give you the easy job of criticizing my insufficiencies
rather than the hard one of advancing what do very much hope is a common proj-
ect. I look forward to the discussion.
1. INTRODUCTION
The administrative state is challenged today in new ways. It must regulate exchanges
with networked industries such as telecommunications and electric power, whose
structure and possible evolution is often opaque to the primary actors themselves,
and among networked firms, whose boundaries and obligations to each other are
constantly in flux. It must protect the public against diffuse and rapidly shifts threats
from, for example, the “non-point source” pollution that runs off countless farms,
homes, and construction sites, and from new, rapidly mutating pathogens spread
quickly through food supply chains by global commerce. As economic volatility—
call it globalization—makes the risks of unemployment and other threats to citizen
well-being effectively uninsurable, the administrative state must restructure such
traditional public services as schools, continuing education programs, and job place-
ment agencies, substance abuse and day care programs to “capictate” individuals and
families—especially those who fare poorly with the “standard” offerings—to find
their way not just in the economy, but in life.
There are sharp, revealing divides in the US, the EU and Latin America as to
whether the administrative state can meet these challenges, and, if so, whether its
eventual successes will increase or (further) diminish the democratic accountabili-
ty of public administration. In the United States authoritative voices (Jerry Mashaw,
Bruce Ackerman—for present purposes the Yale School) suggest that the New Deal
state is unlikely to adjust to the new circumstances.Their empirical touchstones are
the Environmental Protection Agency and the National Highway Traffic
Administration of the Department of Transportation, entities created in the late
1960s and early 1970s, at the height of Congress’s infatuation with top-down, com-
mand and control methods. From this vantage point the administrative state will
fail, and fail unaccountably, at the new tasks for the same reason is largely failed,
with little accountability, at the old: It depends on the expertise of officials who
know vastly more than citizens, legislators, outside auditors and judges about what
needs to be done, but still not nearly enough to solve the problems at hand. And it
is subject to many, conflicting forms of legislative, judicial and managerial oversight
that exacerbate, or at least make it impossible for agencies to correct the very
problems the oversight authorities identify. Given these limits the best and perhaps
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only way to secure social justice in a world that admits of neither effective social
insurance nor the provision of capacitating services is to endow disadvantaged cit-
izens with resources they can use to purchase privately goods and services that bet-
ter their prospects.
Other, equally authoritative voices, such as Richard Stewart’s, hold on the con-
trary that the New Deal state is not, and perhaps never was, as ossified as the Yale
School and others maintain. Looking both to procedural innovations that might have
been (in response, for example, to pressure from the judicial hard look) and at cur-
rent developments at the EPA and elsewhere, Stewart sees the US administrative
state as potentially able to serve new ends by adopting some combination of permit
trading regimes to minimize the cost of social compliance with general regulations,
and introducing non-hierarchic, networked types of decision making to allow gen-
eral rules to benefit from, and in turn inform, local experience. My own work on
the reorganization of public schools, long regarded as a paramount example of the
unreformability of public bureaucracies, goes in the same direction. But Stewart,
and other equally close students of recent developments of the US administrative
state wonder whether the increased efficacy of networked administration may not
come at the price of reduced public accountability, not least because the network
arrangements blur the distinction between governed and government, allowing the
latter to slip the control of the former.
These different assessments of the potential for administrative reform are
reflected in the different reactions of the high federal judiciary on the one hand and
the lower federal bench and State courts on the other. In areas such as school reform,
fair (low-income) housing, and the reform of mental health institutions State courts
have routinely assumed the feasibility of and insisted on organizational reform. On
the authority of State constitutions or legislation they have required poorly per-
forming institutions to meet general goals, such as the provision of an “adequate”
education to poor, minority students as well as to rich, non-minority ones; to create
systems for measuring progress towards those goals; to report the results of period-
ic measurement to the public, in ways that allow comparison of how much—or lit-
tle—similarly situated institutions better the condition of at-risk groups; and to
ensure that low performers learn from more successful ones. This form of judicial
oversight, often undertaken in cooperation with legislative reform of the accounta-
bility system to which the affected institutions respond, seems to grow out of and
encourage the diffusion of “network’ administration. (on this see the paper with Bill
Simon on destabilization rights just published in the Harvard Law Review and avail-
able in draft at http://www2.law.columbia.edu/sabel/papers/Chayes20clean.doc) 
The high federal bench, on the contrary, is fixated on establishing the accounta-
bility, and limiting the discretion of administrative agencies, to the exclusion of any
consideration of administrative efficacy.Textualist cannons of interpretation, limiting
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agencies to classes of actions expressly authorized in legislation and insistence that
judges defer t administrators are acting only with the intent of making law are only
two of the nay doctrinal strategies deployed to this end. Such judicially prompted
clarification of the sovereign pedigree of administrative decisions—express and
legitimate delegation by Congress to an agency to make legally consequential rules,
followed by the express declaration of a politically accountable administrative offi-
cial that a decision is to have this effect—could well have the effect of centralizing
decision making. But such is the indifference of both the high federal judiciary and
the academics who comment on their decisions to question of administrative struc-
ture that is impossible to know whether this in an intended outcome, or simply the
side effect of a general view that, despairing of any possibility of reform, simply
seeks to minimize the harm that administration can to democracy.
In the European Union the view of the administrative renewal as feasible, even
likely, but at the cost of democratic legitimacy, is more nearly a mainstream position
than a countercurrent. Renewal seems feasible because in creating the Single Market
while protecting the citizens of member states against many, changing threats to
public health and safety, the EU has already established a web of novel, hard to char-
acterize institutions—“comitological” technical advisory committees, networked
observatory-agencies, the “open method of coordination” for comparing and revis-
ing national practices in many policy areas—whose overall, and generally acknowl-
edged effect is to allow just the contextualization and periodic revision of general
rules that might address the new challenges to the administrative state. EU experi-
ence broadly seen has been that the most satisfactory way to “harmonize” the regu-
latory systems of the member states is by instigating a process of mutual learning
and monitoring in which the discovery of new possibilities changes the actors’ pref-
erences and leads to outcomes different from—and generally superior to—those
that would have been produced by negotiation alone. Indeed the fact that the “win-
ning” coalition in regulatory matters typically does not get what it initially thought
it wanted is a good part of what makes the whole complex process politically sus-
tainable. (form more on this, and reading of the EU developments as deliberative
polyarchy—a type of network governance—see the paper with Josh Cohen at
http://www2.law.columbia.edu/sabel/papers/Cohen-Sabel%20final.doc) 
But this welcome increase in technical problem-solving capacity is widely
regarded as a potential threat to democracy in the EU. It is unclear to what demo-
cratic public the problem solvers are to respond, and the currently compelling ways
of constructing such a public seem at odds with basic features of the emergent sys-
tem of network governance. Thus the EU famously lacks a demos: a natural com-
munity of language, sentiment, and historical experience coherent enough to
embody itself, and its solidary commitments, in a parliament. On one reading the
story ends there, because natural communities are the precondition of nation states,
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which in turn are the precondition for political and social democracy. But a second,
and historically better informed reading argues that the democratic nation state in
fact arose from a circular relation between traditional contexts—substantive
demoi—and a nascent public sphere: a space for the open discussion of the broad
purposes of public power among equal persons ever more free of overriding group
solidarities and everyday practical arrangements. Opinions formed in this public
sphere direct political controversy, which shapes legislation, which orients the
administrative apparatus, which operates to suffuse the original, traditional attach-
ments with an aspect of civic or political loyalty and so broaden and deepen the pub-
lic sphere. “Modern democracy and the nation-state have developed in tandem,”
Habermas, the leading exponent of this view, writes:
Both have jointly produced the striking innovation of a civic solidarity that
provides the cement of national societies. National consciousness emerged 
as much from the mass communication of formally educated readers as from 
the mobilization of enfranchised voters and drafted soldiers. It has been shaped 
as much by the intellectual construction of national histories as by the discourse 
of competing parties, struggling for political power.
To “conserve” (Habermas’ word) the achievements of the democratic nation-
state at the EU level it, is from this vantage point necessary to construct a European
public sphere by refocusing media attention on “European” developments—so citi-
zens in the various member states are discussing the same things at the same time—
and by endowing the EU with political institutions similar to those of the nation-
state—so citizens, from inveterate civic habit, will know (how) to address their pub-
lic concerns to them. Brussels becomes the notional, if not the physical capitol of
the EU, towards which the influence of the public sphere is directed, and from
which the power of law, coursing through administration, flows.
But this historically attractive way of creating the democratic “principal” in the
EU immediately encounters two closely related objections.The first is that the dis-
tinction between public deliberation and practical or technically informed action
characteristic of this notion of the public sphere requires just the kind of cascad-
ing delegation of sovereign authority—from democratic people to legislature,
from legislature to administration—which US experience demonstrates to be
unworkable. Even if we can assume, the Yale school notwithstanding, that the
future of US administration is yet to be written, there is little in its past that war-
rants the assumptions that elected officials, acting on behalf of citizens, can pres-
ent clear rules and standards to agencies, and that those agencies will confine their
activity to the efficient implementation of those rules and standards, subject to
external monitoring. More generally, ‘agency’ problems are the notorious weak
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link in the minimalist views of democracy that accept any duly elected legislative
authority as a legitimate ‘principal’.
More concretely—and here the second objection—EU regulation, and political
deliberation broadly conceived, is already so distributed in administrative processes
beyond the reach of conventional legislative oversight that the Habermasian con-
ception of the public sphere cannot serve as a practical guide to reform. Presciently
or inadvertently, as just noted, the EU has created a system of harmonizing admin-
istration that works as much “horizontally” as “vertically,” and more by federated
influence of lower-level units on higher ones than by top-down determination of
ends and means. If the EU public sphere turns out to be the public sphere of the
nation state writ large, it is unclear to whom it is to address itself. Intuiting this
dilemma, but unable to resolve it, the practical architects of political reform, con-
vened in the Convention for the Future of EU have been careful not to write the
new problem-solving institutions out of the draft constitution, without finding a
way of establishing their democratic legitimacy by writing them in. Conversely,
those familiar enough with the accomplishments of the new problem-solving insti-
tutions to count as their advocates are agnostic, verging on pessimistic, with regard
to their democratic aptitude. As in the US I believe that close attention reveals a
more subtle and promising interplay between administrative adjustment and effec-
tive public oversight. But for now the stark contrast between efficacy and legitima-
cy dominates public debate.
In key Latin American countries such as Brazil, Mexico and Argentina the
prospects for accountable administrative reform are different again. If the adminis-
trative state is widely seen in the US as maladapted to current tasks but perhaps
accountable to a vigilant judiciary, and in the EU as adaptable but unaccountable to
any plausible public, in these countries the administrative state and the public sphere
are evolving together in ways that suggest the possibility— but hardly the inevitabil-
ity—of an adaptive administration responding to a novel pubic. Consider the case of
Brazil as rendered by Avritzer and other participants in this meeting. On the one side
the clientelistic, patrimonial state bequeathed from colonial times, and engorged
with populism and management of import substitution, must open itself to demo-
cratic supervision while reforming to meet challenges different in degree, not kind,
from those faced in the advanced countries. Hence a profusion of new, more or less
“autonomous” entities at various levels of government, at times explicitly modeled
on US examples, but often “networked” on lines that the EU debate tends to
acknowledge even if the US debate does not. On the other side is a potentially new
public sphere, or, more exactly, constellation of new publics, born not in the strug-
gles of nation building but rather in the long fight to democratize oligarchic nation-
al states. The collection of publics or emergent public sphere, born of social move-
ments that mistrusted the day-to-day clientelism at the street level of the old state
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and reviled the anti-democratic isolation of its peak institutions, has two character-
istics that mark it off from the Habermasian model. First, it is concerned at least as
much to monitor specific state actions as to influence general policy; and when deci-
sion-making is decentralized, as it often appears to be, the monitoring shades into a
form of co-decision making, or at least a kind of continuing, informed contestation
of technical expertise by citizen users of public services. Second, the new publics
tend to be local, or at least sub national, without being isolated in a particular set-
ting. Municipal participatory budgeting as Avritzer presents it illustrates both fea-
tures: citizen assemblies, with members drawn from different neighborhood-based
associations, review the performance of municipal road construction agencies and
water utilities, helping to determine the sequence in which districts are connected
to the existing networks, and in some cases the balance of investments among road
building, expanded water service, and other classes of municipal activity.
Could the new post-national public sphere that the democratic domestication of
network governance seems to require arise from such a matrix? To anwer that ques-
tion we need to get a better idea of just what network organization is, and how it
might effect regulation and the public sector generally. The next section goes same
way towards addressing these issues. Then we need to step back from this account
of the emergent form of problem solving to reflect on its possible implications for
democratic accountability and democracy generally. Finally would could begin to
assess Brazilian and Latin American developments more broadly in the light of the
our revised conception of what governance, and democracy, need to do.The “paper,”
as noted, does not address these issues. But I very much hope the conference will.
It is with that goal in mind that I invite you to read on.
2.THEE TYPES OF PRAGMATIST ORGANIZATION
In the century before 1980 the canonical organization was hierarchical and
closed. Headquarters set goals, parsed complex tasks into simpler, more manageable
ones; organizational routines specified how to parse, execute and review the com-
pliance of tasks. Subordinates were rewarded for complying with instructions; mid-
dle managers checked the conformity of activity to plan. After 1980 the canonical
organization is federated—decisions of higher units are shaped by lower ones and
open—the lower units can be formally outside the organization. Or, to capture the
idea that information in the new organization flows up and down as well as sideways,
they are said to be networked. General designs are set provisionally by the highest
level and revised in light of proposals by lower level units responsible for executing
key modules or subsystems. The organizational routines define methods for choos-
ing provisional, initial designs and revising them in the light of more detailed, par-
tial proposals. Collaborators are rewarded for achieving broad goals according to
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standards defined as part of the process by which the goals themselves are set.To get
a more precise idea of how these new organizations work, and of the principles
informing their design, consider three variants of the networked organization as it
appears in both the private and public sectors.
Take first the deliberately innovative organization. This is the canonical case of the
new, networked organization: the firm—it almost always is a firm—whose very
purpose is to produce innovative products or services. Perhaps the best document-
ed example is of design and production in the automobile industry. The process
starts when, say, the new-van design team in an automobile firm sets the general
performance characteristics of the vehicle by benchmarking the best features of cur-
rent vans and exploring which innovations under development can be incorporated
in its design. To benchmark the potential of developmental work the team may ask
for engineering simulations of possible outcomes, “flash market” a product embody-
ing a potentially valuable feature, or otherwise try to test the actual reaction of buy-
ers to some approximation of the design they are exploring. Assessing the results of
these probes, and again guided by reference to leading examples and comparison of
possibilities, the team next provisionally subdivides or, to take a term from cogni-
tive science, “chunks”1 its general goals into subtasks—the design of an engine, or
heating, ventilation and air conditioning system—and chooses a specialist team from
inside or outside the parent company to realize the initial specifications. (It may
seem unduly fussy to refer in this connection to “chunking” rather than the more
familiar “modularizing,” especially since the latter is often used loosely in the auto-
mobile industry and elsewhere to mean the former. But modularization, more
strictly speaking, aims at the creation of fixed, black boxes whose performance is
durably defined in an interface listing the output returned for any input.Where the
corrigible provisionality of design choices being describe here is useful, modular-
ization strictu sensu is, as we will see below, risky, even impossible.) After this initial
chunking separate project teams elaborate all the provisional subsystems concur-
rently, applying to that task the same kind of evaluation of competitors’successful
efforts and developmental possibilities used in the van team’s first round of bench-
marking. In addition, they benchmark the production processes central to their
eventual products to ensure that the methods employed will meet or surpass the
efficiency of their most capable competitors. Engine plants, for instance, will have
to produce engines that are at least as cheap and warrantable as those of competi-
tors making similar engines in comparable volumes.Then the initial overall goals are
modified by the methods of simultaneous or concurrent engineering, e.g. the
engine-design group may find a way to better its target specifications or to cut its
manufacturing costs if it can persuade other component groups that design charac-
teristics should be modified accordingly. Refinement of this iterated co-design con-
tinues once production begins by means of just-in-time and the error-detection and
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correction methods associated with it. In just-in-time production, parts are supplied
to each work station only as needed: ideally, one at a time. Hence disruptions are
immediately visible. A breakdown at one station halts production by stopping the
flow of parts to downstream operations.To assure the flow of production, therefore,
the source of disruption must be identified. This typically requires tracing long
causal chains back to improbable origins by insistent questions sometimes called the
“five why’s”. For example:
Why is machine A broken? No preventive maintenance was performed.
Why was the maintenance crew derelict? It is always repairing machine B.
Why is machine B always broken? The part it machines always jams.
Why does the jam recur? The part warps from heat stress.
Why does the part overheat? A design flaw.
Thus error-detection and correction, like benchmarking and simultaneous
engineering, reveal possibilities for improvement in unexpected (mis-) connec-
tions among the parts of complex endeavors; and the cumulative effect of these
results is captured in improvements in the benchmark standards for various pro-
duction processes.
Benchmarking, simultaneous engineering and error-detection methods like the
“five why’s” are counter-intuitive from the vantage point of classical organization
theory. In classical theory, routines are questioned only in exceptional circum-
stances. It is simply oxymoronic from this perspective to try to do what the new
institutions do as a matter of course: routinely question the suitability of current
routines for defining and solving problems.We can think of these new institutions as
pragmatist: They systematically provoke doubt, in the characteristically pragmatist
sense of an urgent suspicion that routines—habits gone hard, into dogma2—are
poor guides to current problems.3
As a second instance of such pragmatist institutions consider the High Reliability
Organizations (HROs). HROs are well, but incompletely designed to perform without
fail such extraordinarily demanding tasks as generating electric power through
nuclear fission, launching and recovering jet aircraft rapidly from and back onto
pitching, greasy flight decks, launching and recovering space shuttles, or fighting for-
est fires as they race through rough terrain. The designs are necessarily incomplete
because the conditions under which the specified tasks are to be accomplished are
changing continuously in more or less subtle ways. If the organization is not adjust-
ed accordingly, it fails, catastrophically. In the pragmatist terms just introduced,
HROs become disastrously unreliable if they assume that routine, (nearly) invariant
success is the result of following invariant routines; and the organizational challenge
is to avoid accidents day after day without imperceptibly making this assumption.4
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Key to this are error-detection and root-cause analysis disciplines of the sort
broadly familiar from the production/operations level of the innovative organiza-
tion. In the setting of HROs, the most important and characteristic of these is Near-
miss reporting and analysis. Near misses of course are accidents that only acciden-
tally didn’t happen. So the near misses—and beyond that “out-of-control” sequences
that nearly produced near misses—are the urgent analog in the HRO to the line
stoppages in a just-in-time system. Both trigger root-cause analysis meant to uncov-
er not only the proximate cause of the incident, but to eliminate, through redesign
of the organization if necessary, the background conditions which generated the
immediate source of danger.
Note here a circumstance to which return later when considering governance—
the root-cause analysis regimes are often regarded as a key element in the gover-
nance of HROs, and when that is the case they are subject to regulatory scrutiny. For
example nuclear power plants in the US are rated in part on how effectively they
respond to reports to reports of anomalies at other plants that might be of relevance
given their own set-up, and so on.
New Public Services are third case of pragmatist organizations.This type of institu-
tion is little discussed in the organizational sociology literature, but is receiving
increasing attention in various domains of policy studies.Well documented examples
are schools in Texas, Kentucky, North Carolina and elsewhere in the US that actual-
ly teach poor children of color to read and do mathematics with proficiency compa-
rable to that attained by rich, white pupils. The new organizations are like HROs in
being designed to achieve a single, complex task—teach children to read and use
mathematics—and in relying on error-detection to compensate for design deficien-
cies. But there is an important difference. Where the design gaps are in HROs are,
roughly speaking, small in relation to the overall structure (that is why we say it is
well designed) the new public service the situation is reversed: there is lots of “gap”
and little by way of consolidated design. No one, in other words knows how to build
a school system that produces the desired result. Instead the institutional solution is
to build an organization that uses error-detection and correction at the lowest levels
to find ant what works, and then adjust the higher level structures to generalize that
behavior and encourage more refined error detection, and so on. With regard to
reading, for example, all students learn by some idiosyncratic combination of decod-
ing strings of letters/phonemes (phonics) and derivation of the meaning of words
and sentences from context (whole language method).Teachers identify the strengths
and weakness of each student’s mixture of strategies by sampling their skills in brief,
daily sessions, and suggest improvements. (This might be called first-order error
detection and correction.) The performance of students in the same grade is meas-
ured periodically state wide by a standard test, allowing for the comparison of the
performance of teachers within schools, schools, and districts. (second-order error
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detection.) The job of principals in this system is to create conditions in the school
for generalizing the successes of the most successful teachers, and The job of the job
of the principals’ superior—the district supervisor—is to create conditions for dif-
fusing the successes of the most successful principals.
In this way the reformed school is invented through the piecemeal, but even-
tually comprehensive improvement of a crude, but serviceably provisional starting
structure that supposes only the broadest, non-vapid agreement on goals—educa-
tional achievement (by mainstream measures) should not vary across groups in cul-
turally salient hierarchies, and gaps should be closed by leveling up, not down—
and methods—teachers must aid students to improve their individual bundles of
learning strategies, and administrators must aid teachers and other administrators
in doing this.
Accepting now as a stylized fact that the new organizations operate successful-
ly by application of these methods, and leaving for another time questions con-
cerning the morphology of and methods for constructing the networks presumed
in what follows, we return to the classic questions of bounded rationality, efficien-
cy and governance and try to provide a consistent and conceptually plausible
account of this success.
3. BOUNDED RATIONALITY, EFFICIENCY AND GOVERNANCE IN THE
PRAGMATIST ORGANIZATION
RETHINKING BOUNDED RATIONALITY
The centrality of search routines to the new organizations suggests that there is an
alternative to the decomposition of tasks as a solution to the problem of bounded
rationality: Under volatile conditions, when it is given that no one can know the
whole answer to the design question we face, the way to respond to bounded ration-
ality is to find actors who are already solving (part of) the problem we will turn out
to be trying to solve.To be workable any such problem-solving search (regardless of
where in the overall design or production sequence it is conducted) will, at a mini-
mum, have to Disentrench enquiry, directing attention to unfamiliar solutions,
while it Produces sufficient information about advantages and disadvantages of rival
possibilities—the solution space—to become Self limiting. If it doesn’t meet these
requirements the search will be uselessly redundant—when you don’t know what
you are looking for it is especially unproductive to look where you always look—or
outright destructive, sending the actors off on an endless fool’s errand.
Benchmarking and error detection do indeed oblige the actors to search for
solutions in a novel, initially open, but ultimately bounded space of possibilities: the
set of best current or potential designs (benchmarking) or the activity chains that
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might have caused a particular breakdown (error detection). The initial canvas of
design solutions is of necessity novel and open because it must consider responses
that are “like,” but potentially better than current practice on at least some of many
dimensions, and “like” has no determinate meaning in advance of a particular search.
Indeed, to search for likes is to invite surprises. The point of the search is precisely
to uncover an unsuspected but highly informative resemblance.
Consider by way of example this telling episode in the evolution of the modern
paintbrush. A company is trying with little success to produce the traditional house
painter’s brush with artificial bristles. Even an accomplished artisan can’t apply a
smooth coat of paint with the synthetic bristles.The question arises: what is a paint-
brush like? If a trowel, then the performance is determined by the shape of the bris-
tles’ tip, and the company’s problem is to find an artificial equivalent for the split
ends of natural hairs. If, however, paintbrushes are like pumps, performance is
determined by the contour of the channels formed by the bristles, and the next step
is to reposition the artificial bristles to channel paint correctly.5 In this case the
brush was more like a pump than a trowel—but this result, of course, is provision-
al. In more artfully inclined hands a brush may need to be less a pump than a trow-
el, sling-shot or eyedropper.
As in this example, each possibility considered in metaphoric benchmarking
provides a vantage point from which to evaluate the strengths and weakness of the
others. Hence the search produces something “like” a provisional taxonomy or map
of accessible solution strategies in relation to each other. In this way it is self-limit-
ing: Once you have a serviceable map of the solution space, you stop doing cartog-
raphy and decide where you want to go.
ROBUSTNESS AS HIGHLY DYNAMIC EFFICIENCY
Before we can ask about the efficiency of organizations in high-volatility envi-
ronments, however, we have to clarify the question. Efficiency is a static concept, or
rather a concept for stable environments.The efficient solution is just the least-cost
means of reaching a known end. When the ends are various, and by some measure
closely related, it can still be meaningful to speak of “an’ efficient solution or a set
of these. But when the ends become more various and less well specified it no
longer makes sense to speak of optimum or efficient solutions. Instead we can ask
whether our problem-solving technique is robust, meaning that it can be expected
to produce workable answers turbulent task environments. Think of robustness as
highly dynamic efficiency.
To underscore this point let me note here the misleading incompleteness of
Simon’s well-known story about two watch-makers,Tempus and Hora, whose com-
petition is intended to show the robustness (resilience in the face of disruption) of
hierarchical modularization. Tempus and Hora, you will recall, made similarly
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complex watches of about 1,000 parts each. But Tempus, the craftsman, assembles
each watch from 1,000 pieces, while Hora, the mass producer, makes sub-assembles
of 10 pieces each and then combines these into the final product. Simon shows eas-
ily that unless the probability of disruption per unit time is extremely low, Tempus
almost never completes a watch, and the typical disruption destroys an extremely
valuable, nearly finished piece. Hora completes much more work and losses much
less in each disruption, so modularization seems robust.6 And it is in comparison
with craft production of large numbers of extremely complex machines.
But modularization is plainly not robust in our current world, where key mod-
ule makers—meaning here sole-source suppliers of indispensable components—are
routinely destroyed by natural catastrophes or the complete devaluation of a core
capacity through a competitor’s innovation. The robust strategy in this world is one
where there is no difference between setting up the production system and repairing
or replacing it in case of disruption; or, put another way, where the same principles
that generate the initial set-up also generate innovative transformations of that first
design as circumstance require. These are the principles that our robust producer,
Quaesitor, follows when she searches for collaborators who are good at searching for
collaborators all the way down. In this system, if any of the producers “breaks,” the
broken one and its collaborators find at least one replacement or substitute.
The destruction, by fire, and the almost instantaneous, collaborative recon-
struction of the capacity of a key Toyota supplier illustrates the robustness of
Quaesitor-type re-chunkers. When it burned down in 1997, Aisin’s Kariya plant 1
in Kobe was the extraordinarily efficient, sole-source supplier to Toyota of P-values,
a relatively simple, but high-precision component of an anti-skid break-control
mounted on all of the assemblers’ makes and models. True to its just-in-time disci-
pline, Toyota had only two-days’ worth of P-values in inventory on the day the fire
broke out; when that stock was exhausted, the assembly lines stopped. But by 3 days
after the fire a congeries of a few Aisin suppliers and many other firms in the Toyota
group—very few with prior experience in manufacturing this particular part, all
presumably motivated by solidarity and the self interested desire to return to nor-
malcy and distinguish themselves on the way—were producing more than a hundred
types of P-valves in their own facilities. By 5 days after the fire two of Toyota’s Kobe
plants were reopened; 3 days later car production was at more than 90 percent of
the pre-fire level; a week later there was no shortage of P-values at all. Ultimately
62 firms became emergency producers of P-values; these producers themselves
relied on more than 150 emergency suppliers. So devastating had been the fire that
none of the participants had access to the precision tooling that Kariya plant 1 used
to make the original part. Aisin did contribute to the recovery by installing thou-
sands of additional phone lines to respond to requests for information. But neither
it nor Toyoda attempted to direct the reconstruction effort.
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The key to the extraordinary success was the participants’ vast, common expe-
rience of the Toyoda variant of iterated co-design: Aisin could characterize the part
and the production process in general terms—chunk them; the emergency pro-
ducers could devise, starting from their own experience, many different ways
(some quite innovative) of achieving these ends. Then they could chunk the
processes they were contemplating so that their suppliers could do the same with
respect to subtasks. So, as Quaesitor would have expected, the same disciplines that
generated a network of “module makers” continuously searching for ways to
improve also generated the capacity to search out alternative solutions if one of the
network’s module-making nodes fails. In a malign world this distinction between
efficiency and robustness would translate into an impossible choice: we would have
to either increase efficiency or increase robustness, without knowing from one day
to the next which is called for. In a more benign world we would expect that
increased robustness would increase efficiency as well, so that measures that help
us enhance performance in a volatile environment also improve operations under
more stable conditions. This is in fact what we observe with the new organization.
I suspect that the overlap between robustness-enhancing and efficiency-enhancing
mechanisms explains a good deal of the explosive diffusion of this new institution-
al type.. The consider as an illustration of this overlap benchmarking and the
metaphoric learning associated with it. In a volatile environment we expect tomor-
row’s conditions to differ sharply from today’s. So minimal prudence demands that
we continuously benchmark new developments to avoid disastrous surprises. But
we just saw that benchmarking searches inform us about all the possibilities in
the—expanded—solution space. That means that so long as the environment has
not cooled down to the organizational equivalent of absolute zero, where bench-
marking itself is unnecessary because conditions never change, these comparisons
tell us new things about solutions we already know even as they reveal solution-
strategies we had not foreseen at all. This is surely an important part of the reason
that comparison of additional variants often improves the reliability the eventual
designs rather than degrading it.
Something similar is probably at work with the second mechanism: concurren-
cy. Concurrent development—in which “upstream” and “downstream” steps pro-
ceed simultaneously, each taking account of the (changes in the) requirements of the
other—is almost unavoidable when rapid change puts a prohibitive penalty on miss-
ing, or being late for a market, But like benchmarking, concurrent development
sheds new light on familiar designs and practices even while illuminating new envi-
ronments. In particular concurrency calls into question taken-for-granted assump-
tions about the relation among components in any subsystem by prompting chains
of what-if questions about how perturbations in the environment would reverberate
through the inner structure of the complex. So in all but the most stable settings,
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some concurrency probably leads to efficiency-improving discoveries about short-
comings in familiar arrangements while also increasing robustness.
GOVERNANCE
Governance in the classic organization, we saw, is on the principal-agent model, or
its stake-holder variant.The agent is punished for using her discretion to make self-
interested use of gaps or imprecision in the principal’s plan. She is rewarded for
faithfully following that plan, or, better yet, using her discretion to fill gaps and cor-
rect mistakes in a way that realizes its master goal. Principal-agent governance is
plainly unworkable in the pragmatist, search organization, because in such organiza-
tions final goals are the product, not the starting point of organizational activity. In
this network setting the very distinction between principals who set plans and
agents who execute them is blurred. “Agents”— meaning simply those whose rela-
tively narrow responsibilities put them “lower down” in the organization—certain-
ly can’t be held to account for realizing the “principal’s” original plan or complying
with rules specifying their tasks because there was no plan, and hence nothing from
which to derive detailed task assignments.
How, for starters, can accountability can be established if not by looking back-
wards? One alternative is to by looking in effect sideways and forwards, or rather
sideways at how well others are looking forwards. An actor in a pragmatist organiza-
tions is acting accountability when she learns at least as much as other collaborations
about the unfolding possibilities for advancing (and re-defining) the joint project,
and discloses what she learns. Accountability thus becomes a matter of peer review:
All the actors, or some relevant subset of them, assess the capability and intention of
each to engage in iterated co-design or its production-level equivalents. Accountable
behavior no longer entails compliance in the sense of rule following, but rather pro-
vision of a compelling explanation for choosing, in the light of fresh knowledge, one
way of achieving the common goal over others. Hence the accountability systems of
pragmatist institutions will be characterized by declaration of broad goals or per-
formance standards that are explicitly treated as provisional and subject to revision
through the actors’ peer reviews of their own disciplined learning.
Such a rolling review of purpose and performance will only be possible if at least
some of the information needed for the substance of collaborative problem solving
in particular cases can be used for benchmarking the abilities and probity of current
and potential partners. By making each party’s facility with shared and highly reveal-
ing problem-solving techniques transparent to the others, pragmatist organizations
make current collaboration (or the exploration of possible joint work) richly
informative about the potential and risks of partnership. A firm that easily ferrets
out the source of errors with five-why methods will presumably do better at solv-
ing new problems, and hence be more reliable collaborator, than one that gets lost
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in the maze of its own confusions. Similarly, the mutual transparency that results
from co-design disciplines makes it possible to detect, and attempt to correct,
potential problems before they become disasters. Call the fusion of substantive and
evaluative knowledge that allows an organization to learn as it monitors accounta-
bility (and vice versa) learning by monitoring.The explosive diffusion of pragmatist
disciplines and the success of the new organization generally strongly suggest that
such learning by monitoring is in fact workable at the level of individual projects or
the operation of relatively small units, where “workable” here means only that show-
stopping opportunism and inaptitude are detected, not that all interests are perfect-
ly aligned, eliminating every trace of power. At the limit, If participation in the new
disciplines did not facilitate detection of dangerously incapable or opportunistic
partners, the spread of pragmatist organizations would have been quickly stopped by
some variant of the hold up—the collaboration-destroying use of collaborative dis-
coveries—that classical organization theory long took to be a fatal threat to just the
sort of vertically disintegrated co-design commonplace today.
But the very connection between problem-solving substance and partner evalua-
tion that makes learning by monitoring an instrument of governance on the project
or small-unit level seems to rule it out as a mechanism for governing large and com-
plex institutions such as multinational firms, public service providers or regulatory
systems that encompass many different kinds of projects. Deciding to allocate scarce
resources among these different, perhaps competitive projects, or to add entirely new
ones, is of course a central task of such organizations. The ability of a project group
or unit to demonstrate that it and its collaborators are highly capable of developing
new tasks from current ones plainly bears on, but cannot alone decide, such ques-
tions. How, if at all, can such encompassing organizations select projects and maintain
accountability by looking forwards and sideways. Put another way, is there some high-
er-level, project-spanning device, compatible with and perhaps analogous to learning
by monitoring, for disciplining choices about the direction of collaboration and the
identity of collaborators with the help of current, cooperative experience?
We can begin to outline the features of such a governance mechanism by listing
the constraints it will have to respect in operation, just as we did in describing what
turns out to be the closely related mechanism of dis-entrenching search. First, the
forward-looking accountability mechanism must of course produce categories for
comparing, and eventually ranking, different projects. Otherwise it is useless as a
device for project selection. But second, in establishing this comparability, the
accountability mechanism must encourage the exploration of new strategic goals,
not restrict it by only rewarding search for better means to one or a limited range
of given and unchallengeable outcomes. Recall that the aim of the metaphoric
benchmarking key to the pragmatist institution is precisely to encourage the search
for new solutions or projects outside the realm marked out by routine.A governance
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mechanism that created disincentives to just the kind of searches the organization
was designed to perform would plainly be self defeating. Thus the first two condi-
tions just rephrase, and apply to the level of strategic choice, the conditions on dis-
entrenching search: accountability and search mechanisms in pragmatist organiza-
tions must encourage investigation of novel goals, while using mutually illuminating
comparisons among the results to limit the search and establish criteria for choos-
ing a course of action from its results.
A third and closely related condition is that the pragmatist governance system
domesticate, not generate or exasperate power struggles in the organizations to
which they are applied. This seems like it should go without saying: a governance
structure that invites opportunism is an institutional equivalent of a doctor who sys-
tematically violates the Hippocratic oath. But notice that governance in pragmatist
organizations is likely to be especially susceptible to such counter-intuitive abuse
because of the characteristic circumstances that give rise to opportunism in them.
In hierarchies the occasion for opportunism is the agents’ informal—unobserved
and discretionary—revision of formal rules.
Since the unrevised rules are simply unworkable (working to rule is a famously
effective way to paralyze a plant), the informal adjustments that make the organiza-
tion function create opportunities for opportunism as well. The governance system
with all its incentives and reviews is in some sense (and however flawed) a correc-
tive or supplement to the self-limiting distribution of decision-making authority
hard-wired into the hierarchy itself.
In the pragmatist organization as stylized here, in contrast, the actors routinely
exercise discretion, generating or modifying the organization structure even as they
do. We can say either that the emergent or informal network of decision making is
the (new-model) formal structure. Or—in view of the way flexible formalization
makes explicit much tacit knowledge and discretionary action without reducing it to
a traditional rule set—we can say there is neither a formal nor an informal struc-
ture in the traditional sense. In this setting governance, in imposing procedures for
high-level, strategic choices, creates new occasions for opportunism rather than
merely providing a (perhaps faulty) means of limiting existing ones. Consider, for
instance, the case where the governance rules ignore the second constraint and insti-
tutionalize preferences for particular means or ends. In that case the units and proj-
ect groups are tempted to manipulate the center into selecting the rules that show
their own efforts in the best possible light. Indeed the ensuring struggles for power,
and the attendant disincentives to guess wrong about what will be rewarded, is sure-
ly one of the mechanisms by which a misgoverned pragmatist organization chokes
off the very searches it is intended to pursue.
The fourth and final constraint is simply transparency: the governance mechanism
must enable stakeholders—regulators, the public, employees, investors, suppliers,
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creditors—to look into the organization, and into the system of governance itself.
The background assumption here is simply that governance arrangements, like all
other aspects of the pragmatist organization, are provisional, and designed to be
improved in view of the experience they help generate. A governance system whose
key purpose is to facilitate strategic choice among competing projects should allow
stakeholders to go some way towards corroborating the eventual choices by looking
in the relevant detail at the projects under consideration. Or, if the governance sys-
tem fails to provide such corroboration, it should at least reveal enough about its own
operation to allow improvement the next time around.
In posing the problem for pragmatist governance the preceding list of conditions
has also telegraphed a general solution: A pragmatist organization can govern itself
subject to these constraints by applying the core principle of iterated codesign to the
choice of strategy or goals itself. As a first step in a highly stylized version of such a
process the center—acting, perhaps on behalf and with the help of representatives
of the individual subunits—metaphorically or openly benchmarks its overall objec-
tives, looking for goals “like” the current ones, but arguable better on some dimen-
sion. Each of the federated units then does the same with respect to the broad task
for which it is responsible; and the general institutional goals are, if necessary,
revised in the light of the interim results. At least in theory, in metaphorically
benchmarking their goals the overall organization and its subunits make the formu-
lation of their purposes, and what kinds of projects should accordingly be reward-
ed, as open as, and therefore fully responsive to, pragmatist searches at the project
level.Through iterated pooling of the benchmark goals the organization and its units
set the general priorities with which to rank projects. So long as the goal-setting
process remains open in this way there is little incentive to try and seize control of
it: If currently successful projects will routinely be compared with a (limited, but ex
ante unspecified) list of potential alternatives, no group can institutionalize selec-
tion criteria that are reliably favorable to itself. Hence there is no incentive to strug-
gle for control of the goal benchmarking process (except, of course, to replace it
with some method that does allow the powerful to fix purposes their way). Brief
accounts of a range of pragmatist governance mechanisms from the private and pub-
lic sectors indicate how these general principles can be brought to bear in particu-
lar contexts. Take first the case of the Illinois Tool Works, a mid-size conglomerate
with $9 billion dollars in annual sales and nearly 50,000 employees world wide. One
of its divisions makes plastic and metal components, fasteners and assemblies, indus-
trial fluids and adhesives, fastening tools, and welding products for the construction,
automotive and consumer durables markets. Another makes consumer and industri-
al packaging, as well as product identification and quality assurance equipment for
the food retail and service, food and beverage, and capital goods industries.The firm
is organized as a federation of some 600 units. These are financed by headquarters,
ESP1_p075_098.qxd  11/3/05  21:36  Page 19
Revista Direito GV, São Paulo, p. 75-98, 2005. Edição especial 1. 
: CHARLES SABEL094
to which they for the use of corporate research and development facilities. But with-
in these limits the units are largely independent. Each is responsible for setting its
own goals, and is held accountable for outcomes. Because of this focus on compo-
nents and small subsystems, and the flexibility of its individual units, ITW has flour-
ished where mega-module makers, in their rigidity, have floundered.The key gover-
nance rule for goal setting in ITW is derived from Pareto’s rule of thumb that only
a small fraction—about 20 percent—of all the causes of an outcome account for
some 80 percent of the total effect.The 80/20 governance rule obligates the units to
regularly re-determine which 20 percent of their activities account for (roughly) 80
percent of their profits; to built up these disproportionately beneficial activities; and
to spin off or simply abandon the rest. But each unit’s sales to its customers bundle
many different kinds of goods and activities: particular co-design services; unusually
short product-development cycles: innovative use of a particular materials or the
processes by which they are worked. So, following the rule, the unit’s fist task is in
effect to do a root-cause analysis of the grounds of its own current successes, and re-
direct its strategy according to the results. That done, the unit must metaphorically
benchmark the new strategy by exploring potential uses of its newly re-character-
ized capabilities that are “like” the currently successful ones. Because judgments
about the viability of strategies discovered in this way always contain a speculative
element, a subsidiary governance rule provides that managers are not penalized for
being wrong (once or twice), but face immediate sanctions if they are caught pursu-
ing strategies that have not been disclosed and justified to headquarters.This second
rule gives managers an incentive to (temporarily) immunize themselves against the
risks of incorrect decisions by increasing the transparency of their decision making
to headquarters, and so to other units in the firm and outside stakeholders.7
A second illustration is the governance system of Cisco Systems, the leading
maker of network routers, switches and interface devices.To remain competitive in
one of the worlds’ technologically and commercially most volatile markets, Cisco
invests of course heavily in research (roughly 17 percent of sales in recent years).
But the distinctive aspect of its strategy is a policy of acquiring technologies or prod-
ucts pioneered by other, usually much small firms, and then working with the man-
agers of acquired firms to develop them. As of mid 2001, XXX years after its found-
ing, Cisco had incorporated some 75 units through A & D. This policy depends in
turn on two governance rules.The first, dis-entrenching rule obligates business units
to conduct a “make or buy” review when preparing their annual business plan. This
requires each unit to compare the strengths and weaknesses of its current produce
or service, and closely related variants of these, to those alternatives under devel-
opment or already produced by competitors. Because Cicso’s headquarters has rich
knowledge of the changing needs of end users through its sales force, and many ties
to the research community, business unit managers have every reason to identify and
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evaluate potential acquisition targets before they come to general attention. In case
of an acquisition, a second governance rule provides that the inside managers are
rewarded for retaining the managers of the target firm, and integrating them into
Cisco. Together the two rules not only encourage (as at ITW) regular reassessment
and occasional brusque change of strategy and the business—unit level, but also, by
making outsiders into insiders, increase the cognitive diversity of management gen-
erally, and so facilitate the next rounds of assessment and change.8 And of course
business-unit changes can in combination lead to large changes in overall strategy.
The public-sector equivalents of these dis-entrenching governance rules take the
general form of an obligation that each unit measure itself against some general goal
or performance standard—reliable and safe operations, continuous improvement in
service provision—and correct shortfalls revealed by comparison with the per-
formance of others facing similar situations. A straightforward regulatory applica-
tion is the requirement to undertake near-miss analysis in the US nuclear power-
generating industry. Utilities in the industry must report disruptions in their oper-
ations to the Institute for Nuclear Power Operation (INPO), an industry-funded
entity ultimately responsible to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. INPO officials
sift these reports to distinguish harmless disruptions from dangerous ones.
Thorough analyses of the causes of the dangerous disruptions, and ways of prevent-
ing them, are then circulated as Significant Operating Experience Reports, or
SOERs. Industry Operating Experience Reviews then periodically assess the ability
of particular plants to effectively use the SOERs and other means to improve their
own affairs. For purposes of this review, a team of specialists in a variety of areas
evaluates the plant’s troubles since the last INPO inspection, paying particular atten-
tion to the plant’s own reports on how it has responded to SOERs.
Where minute variations in daily operations are less likely to signal the possi-
bility of substantial, hidden risks, the government can require the regulated entity
to scan periodically for possible hazards and present a plan for mitigating those that
it identifies. A regulatory oversight body then evaluates the adequacy of the plans,
and the steps to realize them, against the benchmarks set by the best performers.
The shift in the US in the 1990s from poke-and-sniff (organo-leptic) methods of
ensuring food safety to the hazard analysis of critical control points (HACCPs)
shows the drift of developments.9 In the organo-leptic method an inspector from
the Federal Safety and Inspection Service examines every head of cattle or chicken
being dis-assembled in a slaughterhouse for quality defects and especially signs of
pathogens. The limitation of the method of course is that some pathogens may not
be detectable by the usual examinations, so that meat products leaving the process-
ing plant are not assuredly safe; and even if they are, pathogens introduced at later
stages of the food supply chain would notice. Under the HACCP regulations intro-
duced by the US Department of Agriculture, meat and poultry processors have to
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identify all the points in their production processes where pathogens are likely to
introduced; detail how they will reduce these risks and verify, by testing, the success
of the adequacy of their measures. The HACCP plan must be complemented by a
Standard Sanitation Operations Plan detailing the plant’s regular housekeeping
measures. The role of federal inspectors shifts from direct examination of animal
carcasses to verification of the processors’ hazard reduction systems. This verifica-
tion starts with assessment of the adequacy of the HACCP plan (and the companion
Standard Sanitation Operations Plan) and includes review of the plants test results
as well as independent testing by the inspectors. Eventually the HACCP system is to
cover every link in the food supply chain from farm to plate.10
The US Securities and Exchange Commission is shifting the regime governing
financial disclosures by publicly traded companies in an analogous direction. Having
re-discovered in the recent stock-market bubble that complex rule systems are eas-
ily gamed by managers with powerful financial incentives to do so, the SEC is
requiring firms to practice “critical accounting”: In reporting their financial results,
firms will have to identify the critical accounting issues where their choice among
arguably legitimate but rival methods of valuing results made a material difference
to their statement of overall performance. For each of these issues the firm will have
to document the alternatives considered; the valuation that would have resulted
from the application of each; the reasons for the choice of the method actually used,
and the key participants in the decision-making process that produced the final
result; and even an assessment of the risks to the regulatory system as a whole that
would eventuate if the firm’s preferred method were broadly adopted.
With regard, finally, to complex public services, the dis-entrenching governance
rules typically requires operating units to formulate and periodically revise strategies
for increasing rates of improvement towards a general end. In the case of pragmatist
public school reform discussed above, for example, the general goal is to reduce and
eventually eliminate the difference in performance in key subjects such as reading
and mathematics between affluent, white students and poor students, who are also
often of color. In Texas the State governance regime accordingly requires period test-
ing in these subjects by means of sophisticated standard test that (now) rewards the
ability to conceptualize rather than rote learning. Each school must report the results
of these tests disaggregated by economic and ethnic groups, and the State pools the
data so that parents with children in a particular school can compare the rate of
improvement of improvement of the relevant subgroup in that school to the 39 other
schools in Texas demographically most similar to their children’s. Further dis-aggre-
gation at the district or school level then yields information about the performance
of particular teachers and administrators that can guide further reorganization.
In elaborating these general features of pragmatist governance and illustrating
their practicality the aim is to make plausible the claim that the new search networks
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are in principle governable, but not to suggest that they are already well governed.
On the contrary: Leaving aside cases of egregious financial wrongdoing, it is strik-
ing that there is not a single, generally recognized example of sustained, organized,
and well characterized good governance in a multinational firm, including of course
the many indisputably successful ones. Worse yet, many, if not all, the cases of cor-
porate governance of innovation that have been presented as exemplary soon proved
seriously defective.
REALITY CHECK—GRAPH ON CURRENT GOVERNANCE MESS
Final word on the hope for democracy in the revolt against routine. No one
should believe that democracy is about to be reborn just because there is pervaise
pressure to redistribute “improvisation” rights. But only a congential pessimist can
be unmoved by the possibility that the deepest fundaments of our despair about
democracy and self determination are being quietly shaken by a revolution in organ-
ized problem solving.
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4 Weick, Sutcliffe, and Obstfelf 
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Thought. Ortony, A., ed. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979. pp. 254-283, pp. 257-259.
6 Simon, The Science of the Artificial, pp. 90-92.
7 See Herrigel’s essays, and his interview with ITW officer. Notice that in casting about for an organizational
solution to the innovator’s dilemma of managing “sustaining” or routine lines of business without being blindsided by
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Nypro, like ITW provides central research and development services to its largely independent business units. The key
difference is that Nypro has no equivalent to ITW’s 80/20 dis-entrenching rule. Instead the firm uses periodic meetings
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among unit managers to spread ideas and develop a cooperative culture despite their rivalry for the headquarters’
approval. In addition the CEO keeps close touch of innovations that diffuse among several units, and requires that the
most successful of these be incorporated into the firm’s standard operating procedures. There are, however, no system-
atic incentives, as there are at ITW, to scrutinize present practices for clues about new markets. This, for Christensen,
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Reduction; Hazard Analysis and Critical control Point (HACCP) Systems; Final Rule, Federal Register, Thursday, July
25, 1996, 38805-38850.
10 For the limits to the current implementation of the HACCP, see Petersen, Melody, and Drew, Christopher,
“New Safety Rules Fail to Stop Tainted Meat,” New York Times, Oct 10, 2003. pg. A.1. But for an illustration of the ways
this system produces the information needed to pinpoint deficiencies it its own implementation, see US Department of
Agriculture, Office of Inspector General, Great Plains region Audit Report, Food Safety and Inspection Service Oversight
of Production Process and Recall at Conagra Plant (Establishment 969), rep[ort No. 24601-2-KC, September 2003.
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